Overview
The System FMEA Risksheet provides a structured analysis framework for identifying how system-level failures can occur, assessing their initial risk severity, and tracking mitigation effectiveness. It bridges upstream HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) results to downstream DFMEA (Design FMEA) failure modes and manufacturing Process FMEA, creating a complete safety analysis chain across the V-Model.
Key characteristics:
- Three-level hierarchical analysis (System Item → Failure Mode → Cause)
- Nine progressive workflow views guiding users through FMEA stages
- AIAG-VDA Action Priority (H/M/L) calculation with severity/occurrence/detection thresholds
- Automatic post-mitigation risk assessment
- Traceability to downstream DFMEA failure modes via the
causes link
- Risk control assignment and verification tracking
- Safety-critical (SC) and critical characteristic (CC) classification
Hierarchical Structure
The System FMEA organizes data in three collapsible levels:
| Level | Element | Purpose |
|---|
| Level 1 | System Item / Customer Requirement | Top-level subject of analysis (e.g., “AEB System Sensor Unit”) |
| Level 2 | Failure Mode | How the item could fail (e.g., “No output signal from sensor”) |
| Level 3 | Cause | Why the failure mode occurs (e.g., “Sensor power supply failure”) |
Each level can be expanded or collapsed to navigate the risk tree. Level aggregation (e.g., summing RPN or AP values up from causes to failure modes) is controlled by the collapseTo property:
{
"hierarchy": [
{
"level": 1,
"controlColumn": "item",
"zoomColumn": "item"
},
{
"level": 2,
"controlColumn": "failureMode",
"zoomColumn": "failureMode"
},
{
"level": 3,
"controlColumn": "cause",
"zoomColumn": "cause"
}
],
"collapseTo": [
{ "from": 3, "to": 2, "aggregateBy": "failureMode" },
{ "from": 2, "to": 1, "aggregateBy": "item" }
]
}
Users drill down by clicking expand arrows next to item names, revealing failure modes for that item, then causes for each failure mode.
Progressive Workflow Views
System FMEA analysis follows a structured 7-step process. The risksheet provides nine named views to support this workflow, each showing only the columns relevant to that analysis stage:
| View Name | Step | Purpose | Key Columns Visible |
|---|
| Default | N/A | Complete view without traceability columns | All except upstream/downstream risk links |
| No Up/Down Risks | N/A | Simplified view without external risk traceability | All except multiItemLink columns |
| 1. Identify Failure Modes | 1 | Define failure modes for each system item | Item, Failure Mode, Effect of Failure |
| 2. Initial Risk Ranking | 2 | Assess initial Severity, Occurrence, Detection and calculate pre-mitigation AP | Severity, Occurrence, Detection, premitigation AP |
| 3. Link Downstream DFMEA | 3 | Trace failure modes to downstream Design FMEA | Downstream DFMEA failures (causes link), system element context |
| 4. Define Mitigations | 4 | Assign risk controls and prevention/detection measures | Risk Control (task link), Prevention Control, Detection Control |
| 5. Verify Controls | 5 | Review control effectiveness and verify completeness | Risk Control Status, Requirements Traceability (control → requirement → test) |
| 6. Final Risk Evaluation | 6 | Reassess Occurrence and Detection post-mitigation, calculate post-mitigation AP | Occurrence (updated), Detection (updated), postmitigation AP |
| 7. Risk Summary | 7 | Review residual risk and document closure status | postmitigation AP, Risk Summary Notes, Follow-up Status |
| Full View | N/A | All columns including full traceability | Complete column set |
Progressive disclosure prevents overwhelming users with hundreds of columns. Each view focuses on a single analysis phase, reducing cognitive load and improving data quality.
Use the progressive views in order (Steps 1–7) to guide your analysis team through the SFMEA workflow. Views enforce discipline by showing only relevant data at each stage, reducing decision-making complexity.
Action Priority Calculation
Action Priority (AP) is calculated using the AIAG-VDA 2019 FMEA methodology, which classifies risks as High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) based on Severity, Occurrence, and Detection ratings. Unlike traditional RPN (Risk Priority Number, which multiplies S×O×D), AP uses threshold-based decision logic.
Pre-Mitigation Action Priority (Initial Risk)
The pre-mitigation AP formula evaluates initial Severity, Occurrence, and Detection before any risk controls are implemented:
function calculateAP(severity, occurrence, detection) {
// High (H) conditions (any one met):
if (severity >= 9) return 'H'; // Severity critical
if (severity >= 5 && occurrence >= 4) return 'H'; // High sev + moderate freq
if (severity >= 6 && occurrence >= 4 && detection >= 5) return 'H'; // High sev + detectable
// Medium (M) conditions (any one met):
if (severity >= 5 || occurrence >= 4 || detection >= 6) return 'M';
// Low (L) - default
return 'L';
}
Decision Logic:
- High (H): Assigned when severity is critical (≥9), or severity is high (≥5) with detectable failure modes (occurrence ≥4), or when all three ratings exceed minimum thresholds
- Medium (M): Assigned when at least one factor (severity, occurrence, or detection) reaches moderate level without triggering High
- Low (L): All factors are below medium thresholds
Post-Mitigation Action Priority (Residual Risk)
After risk controls are implemented, the post-mitigation AP uses the original Severity but updated Occurrence and Detection ratings:
function calculateAPNew(severity, occurrenceNew, detectionNew) {
// Same threshold logic, but uses updated Occ/Det values
if (severity >= 9) return 'H';
if (severity >= 5 && occurrenceNew >= 4) return 'H';
if (severity >= 6 && occurrenceNew >= 4 && detectionNew >= 5) return 'H';
if (severity >= 5 || occurrenceNew >= 4 || detectionNew >= 6) return 'M';
return 'L';
}
Key Principle: Severity does not change post-mitigation because it represents the inherent consequence of the failure mode—controls cannot reduce the severity of the effect, only prevent occurrence or detect before impact. Occurrence decreases through prevention controls; detection improves through better monitoring.
If post-mitigation AP remains High (H), the failure mode requires additional risk controls or acceptance justification. ISO 26262 and AIAG-VDA require residual risk to be at acceptable levels (typically Low or justified Medium). See Risk Control Types for mitigation strategies.
Configuration Schema
| Property | Type | Default | Description |
|---|
name | string | ”System FMEA” | Display name of the risksheet |
description | string | ”ISO 26262 / AIAG-VDA System Level Failure Mode and Effects Analysis” | User-facing description |
documentType | string | ”risksheet” | Risksheet identifier |
dataSourceId | string | Required | Polarion module ID containing FMEA work items |
version | string | ”1.0” | Configuration version for change tracking |
Hierarchy Definition
| Property | Type | Default | Description |
|---|
hierarchy[].level | integer | Required | Nesting depth (1=top, 2=middle, 3=bottom) |
hierarchy[].controlColumn | string | Required | Column name that uniquely identifies items at this level |
hierarchy[].zoomColumn | string | Required | Column to focus on when user clicks expand in navigator |
collapseTo[].from | integer | Required | Source level for aggregation |
collapseTo[].to | integer | Required | Target level for aggregation |
collapseTo[].aggregateBy | string | ”groupBy” | Grouping column name for hierarchy navigation |
Example:
{
"hierarchy": [
{ "level": 1, "controlColumn": "item", "zoomColumn": "item" },
{ "level": 2, "controlColumn": "failureMode", "zoomColumn": "failureMode" },
{ "level": 3, "controlColumn": "cause", "zoomColumn": "cause" }
],
"collapseTo": [
{ "from": 3, "to": 2, "aggregateBy": "failureMode" },
{ "from": 2, "to": 1, "aggregateBy": "item" }
]
}
Column Groups
Columns are organized into semantic groups that appear together in related views:
| Group Name | Purpose | Typical Columns |
|---|
| Context | System context and item identity | System Element, Item, Function |
| Failure Definition | How the item could fail | Failure Mode, Effect of Failure, Effect Description |
| Set Ranking (Pre-Mit) | Initial risk assessment | Severity, Occurrence, Detection, premitigation AP |
| Mitigation Strategy | Risk control assignment | Risk Control, Prevention Control, Detection Control |
| Control Verification | Effectiveness assessment | Control Status, Requirements Traceability, Verification Evidence |
| Final Ranking (Post-Mit) | Residual risk assessment | Occurrence (updated), Detection (updated), postmitigation AP |
| Traceability | Upstream/downstream links | Upstream SFMEA, Downstream DFMEA, Safety Goals |
| Closure | Status tracking | Follow-up Status, Risk Summary Notes, Closure Date |
Column Definitions
Each column maps to a work item field or link type:
| Column | Field/Link | Type | Editable | Description |
|---|
item | (itemLink “assesses”) | itemLink | No | System Item being analyzed; links to systemElement or customerRequirement |
failureMode | failureMode | text | Yes | Description of how the item could fail |
effectOfFailure | effectOfFailure | text | Yes | Consequence visible to customer or downstream system |
severity | severity | enum | Yes | Initial severity rating (1–10 scale); see FMEA Severity |
occurrence | occurrence | enum | Yes | Initial occurrence/frequency rating (0–10 scale); see FMEA Occurrence |
detection | detection | enum | Yes | Initial detection rating (0–10 scale); see FMEA Detection |
premitigation_ap | premitigationAP | formula | No | Calculated initial Action Priority (H/M/L) from S/O/D |
cause | causeOfFailure | text | Yes | Root cause description for the failure mode |
preventionControl | preventionControl | text | Yes | Control that prevents the cause from occurring |
detectionControl | detectionControl | text | Yes | Control that detects the failure before impact |
riskControl | (taskLink “mitigates”) | taskLink | Yes | Risk control work item assigned to address this cause |
controlStatus | (task status) | read-only | No | Status of linked risk control task |
requirementsTraceability | (server-rendered) | computed | No | All Requirements linked back via Risk Control; shows verification chain |
occurrenceNew | occurrenceNew | enum | Yes | Updated occurrence rating post-mitigation (should decrease with controls) |
detectionNew | detectionNew | enum | Yes | Updated detection rating post-mitigation (should improve with controls) |
postmitigation_ap | postmitigationAP | formula | No | Calculated residual Action Priority using original Severity and new O/D |
downstreamDFMEA | (multiItemLink “causes”) | multiItemLink | Yes | Downstream Design FMEA failure modes traced from this cause |
sccc_classification | scccClassification | enum | No | Safety Critical (SC) or Critical Characteristic (CC) badge |
Cell Decorators (Visual Renderers)
Risksheet uses custom JavaScript cell renderers to apply visual styling:
| Decorator | Applies To | Rendering |
|---|
APFormatter | premitigation_ap, postmitigation_ap | Large colored letter (H/M/L) with full label below; background color: red (#DC143C) for H, orange (#FF8C00) for M, green (#4CAF50) for L |
SCCCBadge | sccc_classification | Inline badge: orange background (#ff8c00) for SC, red (#c62828) for CC; rounded corners; uppercase text |
RowHeaderAPColor | (row header) | Background color inherited from postmitigation_ap value; enables visual scanning of residual risk levels |
Views Configuration
{
"views": [
{
"name": "1. Identify Failure Modes",
"columnGroups": ["Context", "Failure Definition"]
},
{
"name": "2. Initial Risk Ranking",
"columnGroups": ["Context", "Failure Definition", "Set Ranking"]
},
{
"name": "3. Link Downstream DFMEA",
"columnGroups": ["Context", "Failure Definition", "Traceability"]
},
{
"name": "4. Define Mitigations",
"columnGroups": ["Context", "Failure Definition", "Mitigation Strategy"]
},
{
"name": "5. Verify Controls",
"columnGroups": ["Mitigation Strategy", "Control Verification"]
},
{
"name": "6. Final Risk Evaluation",
"columnGroups": ["Set Ranking", "Final Ranking"]
},
{
"name": "7. Risk Summary",
"columnGroups": ["Final Ranking", "Closure"]
}
]
}
Property: premitigationAP
// Evaluate initial Severity, Occurrence, Detection
var sev = parseInt(row.severity);
var occ = parseInt(row.occurrence);
var det = parseInt(row.detection);
// High threshold checks (any one match = High)
if (sev >= 9) return 'H'; // Critical severity
if (sev >= 5 && occ >= 4) return 'H'; // High sev + frequent
if (sev >= 6 && occ >= 4 && det >= 5) return 'H'; // Detectable high risk
// Medium threshold checks
if (sev >= 5 || occ >= 4 || det >= 6) return 'M';
// Low (default)
return 'L';
Post-Mitigation Action Priority Formula
Property: postmitigationAP
// Use ORIGINAL severity, but UPDATED occurrence and detection
var sev = parseInt(row.severity);
var occNew = parseInt(row.occurrenceNew) || parseInt(row.occurrence);
var detNew = parseInt(row.detectionNew) || parseInt(row.detection);
// High checks
if (sev >= 9) return 'H';
if (sev >= 5 && occNew >= 4) return 'H';
if (sev >= 6 && occNew >= 4 && detNew >= 5) return 'H';
// Medium checks
if (sev >= 5 || occNew >= 4 || detNew >= 6) return 'M';
return 'L';
Link Types and Traceability
| Link Role | Source | Target | Direction | Purpose |
|---|
assesses | failureMode | systemElement | outgoing | Defines which system element the failure mode applies to |
causes | failureMode (SFMEA) | failureMode (DFMEA) | outgoing | Traces System FMEA failure modes to Design FMEA failure modes |
mitigates | riskControl | failureMode (SFMEA cause) | outgoing | Assigns risk control task to address this cause |
refines | systemElement | systemElement | hierarchical | Links subsystems to system or components to subsystem |
Traceability Chain: SFMEA → Risk Control → Requirements → Tests
Server-rendered columns traverse this chain to show verification evidence.
Downstream DFMEA traceability (via causes link) must be established manually during Step 3 of the workflow. System FMEA team members link each cause to the corresponding Design FMEA failure modes they could trigger in subsystems or components.
Configuration Property Table
| Category | Property | Type | Default | Editable | Description |
|---|
| Metadata | name | string | ”System FMEA” | No | Configuration display name |
| description | string | ”ISO 26262 / AIAG-VDA System FMEA” | No | Purpose and standards compliance |
| dataSourceId | string | Required | No | Polarion module containing SFMEA work items |
| version | string | ”1.0” | No | Configuration version for tracking changes |
| Hierarchy | hierarchy[].level | integer | Required | No | Nesting depth (1, 2, or 3) |
| hierarchy[].controlColumn | string | Required | No | Column name that identifies items at this level |
| collapseTo[].from | integer | Required | No | Source level for aggregation |
| collapseTo[].to | integer | Required | No | Target level for aggregation |
| Columns | columnGroups[].name | string | Required | No | Semantic group name (Context, Failure Definition, etc.) |
| columns[].id | string | Required | No | Unique column identifier |
| columns[].field | string | Required | No | Work item field or link role name |
| columns[].label | string | Required | No | User-facing column header text |
| columns[].editable | boolean | false | No | Whether users can modify cell values |
| Views | views[].name | string | Required | No | Progressive workflow stage name |
| views[].columnGroups[] | array | Required | No | Column group names to display in this view |
| Formulas | formulas.premitigationAP | string | Required | No | JavaScript function to calculate initial AP |
| formulas.postmitigationAP | string | Required | No | JavaScript function to calculate residual AP |
| Decorators | cellDecorators[].field | string | Required | No | Column to style |
| cellDecorators[].renderer | string | Required | No | Renderer function (APFormatter, SCCCBadge, etc.) |
Integration Points
Upstream: HARA and Safety Goals
System FMEA typically starts after HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) is complete. SFMEA failure modes should contribute to or validate HARA results:
- HARA identifies system hazards (malfunctions that could harm users)
- SFMEA identifies failure modes that could cause those hazards
- Safety goals from HARA provide context for which SFMEA failure modes are safety-critical
Reference: ISO 26262 Functional Safety
Downstream: Design FMEA
During Step 3 of the SFMEA workflow, causes are traced to Design FMEA failure modes via the causes link. This establishes a design decomposition chain:
- SFMEA: “Sensor signal loss”
↓ causes
- DFMEA: “Sensor power supply failure” (Component DFMEA)
- DFMEA: “Sensor communication line open circuit” (Component DFMEA)
Reference: Design FMEA Risksheet Configuration
Manufacturing: Process FMEA
System FMEA design controls are eventually handed off to Process FMEA, which identifies manufacturing failure modes that could prevent controls from working. PFMEA typically includes control plan items that implement SFMEA risk controls in production.
Reference: Process FMEA Risksheet Configuration, Process FMEA
Supporting Standards
System FMEA configuration implements:
- ISO 26262-5 (hardware design) — system-level risk analysis context
- AIAG-VDA FMEA 2019 — Action Priority methodology and severity/occurrence/detection rating scales
- IATF 16949 / APQP — SC/CC classification linking failure modes to characteristics requiring control
- ISO 21448 (SOTIF) — intended functionality and foreseeable misuse scenarios
Common Configuration Patterns
Pattern: Enabling Safety-Critical Filtering
To show only High post-mitigation AP failures:
{
"columnGroups": [
{
"name": "Risk Filter",
"columns": [
{
"id": "filter_high_ap",
"label": "High Residual Risk Only",
"type": "filter",
"filterExpression": "postmitigationAP == 'H'"
}
]
}
]
}
Pattern: Custom Severity Scale
To use a different severity scale (e.g., 1–5 instead of 1–10):
{
"enumerations": {
"severity": {
"1": "Negligible",
"2": "Minor",
"3": "Moderate",
"4": "Major",
"5": "Critical"
}
},
"formulas": {
"premitigationAP": "if (sev >= 5) return 'H'; if (sev >= 3) return 'M'; return 'L';"
}
}
Pattern: Automatic Risk Control Creation
To auto-generate risk control work items for High AP failures:
{
"automations": [
{
"trigger": "cellChange",
"condition": "premitigation_ap == 'H' && riskControl == null",
"action": "createRiskControl",
"template": "HighAPMitigation"
}
]
}
Best Practices
Use the progressive views in sequence (1–7). Do not jump to Step 6 before completing Steps 1–5. Early completion of mitigations prevents rushing through verification.
Severity should be assessed from the customer/user perspective. Ask: “If this failure occurred in the field, what is the worst-case consequence?” Reference FMEA Severity for scale definitions.
Occurrence and Detection should change post-mitigation. If they remain the same, the risk control is not effective. If only occurrence improves, you have a prevention control. If only detection improves, you have a detection control. Best controls improve both.
Do not accept unmitigated High post-mitigation AP without documented justification. Work with Safety and Quality to determine acceptable residual risk levels for each ASIL classification. See ASIL Classification System.
Complete columns left-to-right in each view: Define failure modes → Assess initial risk → Link downstream risks → Assign controls → Verify → Reassess → Close. This order matches the logical workflow and reduces rework.